Fourth Amendment--of Warrants, Electronic Surveillance, Expectations of Privacy, and Tainted Fruits by Webber, Dawn
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 75
Issue 3 Fall Article 5
Fall 1984
Fourth Amendment--of Warrants, Electronic
Surveillance, Expectations of Privacy, and Tainted
Fruits
Dawn Webber
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Dawn Webber, Fourth Amendment--of Warrants, Electronic Surveillance, Expectations of Privacy, and Tainted Fruits, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 630 (1984)
0091-4169/84/7503-630
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 75, No. 3
Copyright 0 1984 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
FOURTH AMENDMENT-OF WARRANTS,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE,
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY, AND
TAINTED FRUITS
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Karo,' the United States Supreme Court held
that government agents who, without a warrant, monitored a
beeper 2 in a private residence had violated the fourth amendment
rights of those who had a justifiable interesr in the privacy of the
residence.8 The Court, however, held that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals should not have suppressed evidence that the agents had
seized subsequent to the initial violation of respondents' constitu-
tional rights. 4 The Court ruled that the government agents later
had obtained sufficient untainted information apart from the initial
search and seizure to furnish probable cause for a search warrant. 5
Although the Court followed precedent and found that the agents
had infringed respondents' fourth amendment rights, the Court de-
parted from its former reverence for the protection of constitutional
rights and its abhorrence of illegally obtained evidence and found
that the evidence was untainted.
6
This Note will examine why the Court found that agents who,
without a warrant, monitored a beeper attached to a can of noncon-
traband in a private residence violated fourth amendment rights
against search and seizure.7 The Note will analyze the Court's rul-
ing that mere attachment of an electronic beeper to a can containing
1 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
2 Brief for Respondents Karo, Roth and Steele at 5-6, United States v. Karo, 104 S.
Ct. 3296 (1984). A beeper is a radio transmitting device that emits signals. The beeper
can be followed by a person with a receiver that picks up the signals that the beeper
emits. Neither the briefs nor the record indicate how far the beeper signal travels.
3 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
4 Id. at 3307.
5 Id.
6 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
7 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
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noncontraband did not violate fourth amendment rights.8 Finally,
the Note will explore the Court's holding that certain evidence that
government agents obtained after they had violated respondents'
fourth amendment rights was not tainted by the agents' illegal
conduct.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE KATZ TEST
Until the Court in Katz v. United States'0 delineated a new test to
determine whether government agents have violated a person's
fourth amendment rights, electronic surveillance did not violate a
defendant's fourth amendment rights in criminal proceedings. Gov-
ernment agents violated fourth amendment rights only if they bod-
ily seized the defendant, physically invaded the defendant's home,
or seized the defendant's personal property."' The Court in Olm-
stead v. United States12 held that government agents who had tapped
the defendant's private telephone line did not violate the fourth
amendment because the government had accomplished the wiretap-
ping without a physical trespass.13 In Olmstead, the agents tapped
the defendant's telephone line through the telephone company lines
and recorded the defendant's conversations. 14 The agents commit-
ted no trespass on the defendant's property.' 5 The Court held that
the agents had not committed a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment because the agents did not enter the defendant's pri-
vate residence or office.
16
The Court in Goldman v. United States17 and in On Lee v. United
States'8 clarified that a physical encroachment on a constitutionally
protected area was necessary for a fourth amendment violation. In
Goldman, government agents had placed a detectaphone on a wall in
order to listen to the defendant's private conversation in an adjoin-
8 Id. at 3302.
9 Id. at 3307.
10 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11 Id. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black, however, maintained that ac-
cording to the plain meaning of the words of the fourth amendment, electronic surveil-
lance is neither a search nor a seizure.
12 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13 Id. at 464.
14 Id. at 456-57.
15 Id. at 457.
16 Id. at 464.
17 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
18 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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ing room. 19 The Court specifically declined to overrule Olmstead and
found that no physical trespass had occurred; therefore, the agents'
actions did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 20
In On Lee, government agents equipped an informer, a friend of
the defendant, with a transmitting device.2' The informer visited
the defendant's laundry and engaged him in conversation. During
the conversation, Lee made damaging admissions transmitted to
and heard by the agents who later testified against Lee at his trial.
22
The Court analogized the informer's actions to eavesdropping on a
conversation and concluded that no constitutional violation had oc-
curred because the informer, who entered Lee's laundry with Lee's
permission, had not trespassed on Lee's property. 23
The Court, however, eventually recognized the new contingen-
cies of search and seizure that advancing electronic technology had
thrust upon modern society. Initially, in Silverman v. United States,24
the Court declined to consider the looming questions about the
"frightening paraphernalia" of the electronic age, and declined to
overrule Olmstead because Silverman involved a physical trespass and,
therefore, was inapposite to Olmstead.25 In Silverman, government
agents had penetrated a wall with a spike and had connected the
spike with the heating system of a home; this physical intrusion be-
came a conduit through which to hear private conversations inside
the home.26 The Court found that the physical intrusion of the
spike violated the fourth amendment.
27
In Lopez v. United States,28 the Court maintained its weakening
position that search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment required a physical intrusion. The Court found that an
Internal Revenue agent did not violate the defendant's fourth
amendment rights when he carried concealed electronic equipment
to record the defendant's words and later used the recording as evi-
dence against the defendant.29 Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting
opinion that the Court would later adopt in Katz v. United States:
19 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131. A detectaphone is a telephonic apparatus with an at-
tached microphone transmitter, used for listening secretly.
20 Id. at 135.
21 On Lee, 343 U.S. at 749.
22 Id. at 749-50.
23 Id. at 751-53.
24 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
25 Id. at 509.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 511.
28 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
29 Id. at 440.
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There is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance...
and conventional police strategems . ... The latter do not so seri-
ously intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk of being overheard
by an eavesdropper or being betrayed by an informer or deceived as to
the identity of one with whom one deals is.. . inherent in the condi-
tions of human society . . . But as soon as electronic surveillance
comes into play, the risk changes crucially. There is no security from
that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not
even a residuum of true privacy . . Electronic surveillance . . .
makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the
most effective tools of tyranny.
30
The Court in Katz v. United States3 l overruled Olmstead and
Goldman and set up a new test for the determination of whether a
fourth amendment privacy interest has been infringed. The new
test expanded the fourth amendment to protect modern contingen-
cies not within the purview of the old test.3 2 In Katz, government
agents had attached a "listening and recording device to the outside
of the telephone booth" in which the defendant placed calls.33 The
Court found that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," 3 4 and held that because an individual has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a telephone booth, the agents had committed
a search and seizure under the fourth amendment.3 5 The fact that
the electronic device did not actually penetrate the wall of the booth
no longer had any constitutional significance. 36
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz contained the spe-
cific words that became the new standard for the determination of
whether the government has violated an individual's fourth amend-
ment right against search and sezure.3 7 Justice Harlan addressed
the question of what exact protection the fourth amendment affords
the people that it protects: "My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the actual expectation be one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "38 Persons expect to
have privacy in their homes; if they manifest no intention to keep
30 Id. at 465-466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32 Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154,
157-64 (1977).
33 389 U.S. at 348.
34 Id. at 351.
35 Id. at 353.
36 389 U.S. at 353.
37 See F. INBAU, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 435-37 (2d ed. 1980).
38 389 U.S. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring). One commentator has foreseen a prob-
lem with the subjective expectation of privacy of this test. A government, to reduce its
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"objects, activities, or statements" to themselves and expose these
things to public view, however, the individuals have no expectations
of privacy in these items.39 Justice Harlan did not define the prior
decisions that engendered this twofold requirement, although he al-
luded to Weeks v. United States40 and Hester v. United States.4 1 The
Court subsequently adopted the Katz test to determine when a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy may be found.
42
In United States v. Knotts,43 the Court further defined the param-
eters of a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Knotts, the Court
found that a person who travels in an automobile on public high-
ways has no reasonable expectation of privacy because the automo-
bile and its occupants are in plain view and are open to public
scrutiny. 44 The Court a year earlier had expanded the automobile
exclusion in United States v. Ross4 5 and held that the exception in-
cludes the government's right to search closed packages and con-
tainers found during a search of the automobile.46 A person has no
reasonable expectation that government agents will not search
closed packages and containers that they find in an automobile; if
probable cause justifies the automobile's search, it justifies the
search of everything in the vehicle that may contain the object of the
search.4
7
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
After the Supreme Court promulgated the Katz test and elimi-
nated physical trespass as a necessary element to a fourth amend-
ment violation, the Court clarified that evidence obtained pursuant
to a fourth amendment violation must be inadmissible in court. In
Alderman v. United States,48 the Court focused on this exclusionary
citizens' subjective expectation of privacy could simply announce searches, thus taking
away any subjective expectation of privacy. See supra note 32.
39 Id.
40 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (a United States marshall cannot search a person's home
without a warrant).
41 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (an individual's actions outside of his home and in clear
view of anyone who might look defeat any claim of fourth amendment rights).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
43 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
44 Id. at 281.
45 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
46 Id. at 822.
47 Id. at 825.
48 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Court addressed the question of who has standing to
assert the protection of fourth amendment rights. In Alderman, the government agents
had placed electronic recording equipment in one of the defendants' place of business.
The questions were whether the overheard conversation was relevant to the prosecu-
tion's case and whether the defendant whose business was "bugged" had standing to
[Vol. 75634
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rule, a rule that had its genesis in Weeks v. United States 49 and Mapp v.
Ohio.50 Justice White stated that the Court would apply the exclu-
sionary rule by weighing the costs to society of releasing guilty indi-
viduals against the benefits to the defendant of suppressing the
evidence:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to jus-
tify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case
against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that
judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of ex-
tending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused
of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth. 51
The Court explicated the boundaries of the exclusionary rule in
United States v. Calandra52 and concluded that the courts should apply
the rule only in cases where the rule would function as an effective
remedy.53 Thus, a defendant would have standing to suppress evi-
dence only in cases where, but for the unlawful search, government
agents could not have obtained the evidence in question.
54
III. FACTS
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) charged James
Karo, Richard Horton, William Harley, Michael Steele, Evan Roth,
and Gene Rhodes with conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent
to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;5 5 the DEA also
charged all of the defendants except Roth with possession of co-
caine with the intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841
object to the evidence obtained by the eavesdropping when the defendant was not pres-
ent during, nor a party to, the conversations. The Court held that the defendant did not
have standing to suppress the evidence. Id. at 170.
49 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (the government could not use letters seized during
an unwarranted search of the defendant's house as evidence against the defendant).
50 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (material confiscated in an unwarranted search is inadmissible
as evidence because the government had violated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights).
51 394 U.S. at 174-75.
52 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.").
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 104 S. Ct. at 3301. 21 U.S.C. § 846 states: "Any person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine
or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed in the offense, the




In August 1980, DEA agents in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
learned through Carl Muhlenweg, an informant, that Karo, Horton,
and Harley had ordered ten cans of ether from Muhlenweg.
Muhlenweg alleged that the three respondents planned to use the
ether to extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported to the
United States.5 7 The government obtained a court order that au-
thorized the installation and monitoring of a beeper 58 in one of the
cans of ether.59 With the informant's consent, the agents substi-
tuted their can, which contained the beeper, for one of the ten cans
that Muhlenweg was to supply to the three respondents, and
painted the cans a uniform color.
60
On September 20, 1980, agents using visual and beeper surveil-
lance observed Karo collect the cans from Muhlenweg and followed
Karo as he delivered the cans to his own residence. 6 1 Later that day,
Karo moved the cans to Horton's house without visual detection,
but agents monitoring the beeper located the cans at Horton's
house.62 Agents confirmed the presence of the cans of ether at Hor-
ton's house when they smelled the ether from the sidewalk in front
of the house. 63 Two days later, agents determined through monitor-
ing the beeper that the defendants had moved the ether to Horton's
father's house. 64 The next day, the agents followed the beeper sig-
nal to a commercial self-storage facility in Albuquerque. Agents lo-
cated the precise locker that contained the ether by detecting the
odor of the ether, and the facility's management confirmed that
Horton and Harley had rented the locker.
6 5
On October 8, 1980, agents obtained court permission to in-
stall an entry tone alarm on the locker door and, while doing so,
56 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) states: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance."
57 104 S. Ct. at 3300. Neither the record nor the briefs indicate whether respondents
imported the clothing.
58 See supra note 2.
59 104 S. Ct. at 3300; Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Karo, 104 S.
Ct. 3296 (1984). The original warrant issued contained falsified information regarding
the informant, allegedly to protect the informant's identity from discovery. Brief for the
United States at 4 n.3.
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observed cans of ether inside.66 The alarm malfunctioned, however,
and did not alert the agents when Horton and Harley removed the
ether from the locker. The manager of the storage facility informed
the agents that the defendants had removed the ether.
67
Three days later, the agents followed the beeper signal to an-
other Albuquerque storage facility where they detected the liquid's
odor and discovered the cans in locker 15.68 The agents obtained a
court order and installed a video camera on the wall that focused on
locker 15.69
On February 6, 1981, agents using the camera observed
Rhodes and an unidentified woman remove the cans from locker
15.70 Horton and the woman loaded the cans into Horton's pick-up
truck. Through both visual and beeper surveillance, agents fol-
lowed the truck to Rhodes' residence; Rhodes parked the truck in
the driveway.
71
Later that day, agents followed the truck to a house in Taos,
New Mexico, that Horton, Harley, and Steele had rented. 72 Agents'
visually surveyed the house and monitored the beeper to ascertain
the presence of the ether.73 The agents suspected that the occu-
pants were using the ether because all of the windows of the house
were open even though it was a cold and windy day.
7 4
On February 8, the agents applied for and received a warrant to
search the residence in Taos.75 The warrant was based in part on
evidence that the agents secured by monitoring the beeper.76 The
warrant was executed on February 10. Agents seized cocaine and
laboratory equipment and arrested Horton, Harley, Steele, and
Roth. 7
7
Before trial in the Federal District Court of the District of New
Mexico, respondents filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence
taken from the Taos house on the grounds that the warrant was in-












77 Id. The ether had been moved to seven different locations over a period of four
and one-half months.
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beeper surveillance. 78 The district court granted the respondents'
motion and concluded that the initial warrant was invalid because it
had contained deliberate misrepresentations; 79 the evidence, there-
fore, was the fruit of an unlawful search. 80 The district court re-
jected the government's subsequent motion to reconsider the
suppression ruling because the agents failed to secure a valid war-
rant for the installation and monitoring of the beeper.81
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sup-
pression order, but excepted evidence against respondent Rhodes
and ruled that Rhodes had no privacy interest in the Taos resi-
dence.8 2 The appeals court rejected the government's argument
that, given the facts of Karo, respondents did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy that the cans of ether would not be searched,
and held that the agents' warrantless monitoring of the beeper had
violated the respondents' fourth amendment rights.83
The government petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari
and raised two questions: whether warrantless installation of the
beeper had violated respondents' fourth amendment rights, and
whether warrantless monitoring of the beeper in a home or private
area had violated respondents' fourth amendment rights.
84
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Karo, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals. 85 The Court, through Justice White, 86 held that the
agents had violated respondents' fourth amendment rights by moni-
toring the cans of ether while the cans were in private areas. 87 The
Court, however, also held that the DEA agents' monitoring of the
beeper before the defendants brought the cans of ether to the sec-
ond warehouse had not contributed to the discovery of the cans at
78 Id.
79 Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984).
83 710 F.2d at 1439.
84 104 S. Ct. at 3301.
85 Id. at 3307.
86 Id. at 3299. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell. Justices Rehnquist and 0' Connor
joined in parts I, II, and IV. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in part III.
Justice O'Connor filed an opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed an opinion in whichJustices Bren-
nan and Marshall joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
87 Id. at 3302.
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the second warehouse.88 The agents, therefore, had not tainted that
particular use of the beeper with prior illegality.89 Thus, Justice
White concluded that the second affidavit for a warrant had con-
tained sufficient untainted information to furnish probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant and that the court of appeals should not
have suppressed the evidence seized in the Taos house with respect
to any of the respondents. 90
The Court first addressed whether the agents legally had in-
stalled the beeper without a warrant, but with Muhlenweg's consent.
Justice White concluded that the agents placing the beeper in the
can of ether had not violated the respondents' fourth amendment
rights to freedom from warrantless searches and seizures. 91 The
Court reasoned that the DEA had owned the can, the DEA had do-
minion over the can, and even if Muhlenweg had owned the can, no
violation of fourth amendment rights occurred because the agents
had affixed the beeper to the can with Muhlenweg's consent.92
In contrast to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the court of ap-
peals found that a violation of respondents' fourth amendment
rights had occurred at the moment of. transfer of the can from
Muhlenweg to Karo. 93 The Court, however, rejected this finding
and found that at the moment of transfer, agents were not searching
the can; thus, the transfer of an unmonitored beeper does not in-
fringe upon anyone's rights. 94 An unmonitored beeper conveys no
information, and thus invades no expectation of privacy that society
considers reasonable.95 The Court reasoned that the transfer of the
can was not a seizure because the agents had not interfered with
possession of the can.96 According to Justice White, the court of
appeals' argument failed because if the unmonitored beeper that the
agents had affixed to the can violated the respondents' constitu-
tional rights, then any object affixed to any can, merely because it
occupies space, would violate the fourth amendment at the moment
that a new possessor acquired the can. 97 The Court, therefore, con-
88 Id. at 3306.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 3306-07.
91 Id. at 3302.
92 Id. at 3301. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. It is not clear how the
Court can conclude this without even considering the possibility that Karo owned the
can.
93 Karo, 710 F.2d at 1441.
94 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
95 See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
96 104 S. Ct. at 3302.
97 Id. The Court implies that an unmonitored electronic tracking device is similar to
"any object, regardless of its nature .... ." Id.
1984] 639
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cluded that the agents infringed no fourth amendment interest by
installing the beeper in the can of ether.98
Justice White then considered whether the agents had violated
a fourth amendment privacy interest by monitoring the beeper.99
He compared Karo with United States v. Knotts. 00 In Knotts, federal
agents, acting without a warrant, affixed a beeper to a can of chloro-
form and monitored the beeper; they monitored the beeper on pub-
lic roads, not while the can was in a private residence. 10 1 The agents
obtained no information from the beeper surveillance that they
could not have gathered by visual surveillance. 10 2 The Court in
Knotts held that because an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy while on public roads, 103 the agents did not invade the
defendant's fourth amendment privacy interests.
10 4
The Karo Court noted that in Knotts, agents had not invaded the
defendant's privacy interest because the agents did not monitor the
beeper in a private residence. 10 5 The Court considered whether the
agents' monitoring of the beeper in Karo's private residence and
storage lockers, areas not open to visual surveillance, violated the
defendants' fourth amendment rights.' 0 6 Justice White decided that
such monitoring does violate the fourth amendment because
searches and seizures in private areas without a warrant are "pre-
sumptively unreasonable."'' 0 7 Karo, therefore, is consistent with
Knotts.s08 Any information that the agents obtained with the beeper
in Knotts could have been obtained visually. In Karo, however, the
agents' monitoring of the beeper while the beeper was inside the
Albuquerque house and storage lockers revealed facts that the
agents could not have learned by visual observation.
The Court rejected the government's contention that agents
can monitor beepers that are located in private areas if they suspect
that the inhabitants will commit a crime, 10 9 and held that although
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, three exceptions ex-
ist: searching an individual in an automobile on the open road;
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
101 460 U.S. at 278-79.
102 Id. at 285.
103 Id.
104 Id.




109 Id. at 3304.
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searching private property with the consent of the owner; and
searching in exigent circumstances. 110 None of these exceptions ap-
plied to the facts of Karo.11
The government argued that because agents have difficulty in
obtaining warrants and because attachment of a beeper to a can is a
miniscule invasion of privacy, then on the facts of Karo, the agents
did not need a warrant to monitor the beeper. 112 Justice White,
however, did not find these arguments compelling."13 The Court
emphasized that warrants are the prerogative of the court, not of the
police. 14 Also, suspected drug dealers are not less entitled to the
protection of the fourth amendment than are other suspected of-
fenders. 1 5 The Court believed that a stringent warrant require-
ment assures society that beepers will not be abused by the
police. 116 The government argued that this stringent position re-
garding warrants would lead to a plethora of warrant applica-
tions."l 7 The Court responded that the likelihood of a large
number of warrants is no reason not to obtain one when neces-
sary.118 Moreover, the government's argument failed because the
DEA agents obtained a warrant to install the beeper in the can of
ether, albeit falsely."19
Justice White disposed of the government's argument that the
agents did not need a warrant because of the particularity require-
ment of the fourth amendment. 120 The amendment provides that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 2 1 The govern-
ment argued that to fulfill this requirement, the agents in Karo
would have had to specify the exact geographic location of the
beeper, an impossible feat in Karo.122 The Court disagreed and
found that the agents could have described the object in which the
beeper would be hidden, the surrounding circumstances, and the
110 Id. The Court did not define exigent circumstances in the Karo opinion. But see
infra note 185 and accompanying text.
111 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
112 Id. at 3304-05.








121 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122 104 S. Ct. at 3305.
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length of time involved in the search. 123 In the Court's view, this
information would have satisfied the particularity requirement. 124
After the Court found that the DEA agents had violated respon-
dents' fourth amendment rights, it turned to a consideration of
whether the evidence was tainted. 125 Justice White stipulated that
the warrant to search the Taos house was valid if the Court found
sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit
to establish probable cause for the second warrant. 126 The Court
decided that the agents could have secured the warrant without the
beeper that had located the cans of ether. Justice White asserted:
The movement of the ether from the first warehouse was undetected,
but by monitoring the beeper the agents discovered that it had been
moved to the second [warehouse]. No prior monitoring of the beeper
contributed to this discovery; using the beeper for this purpose was
thus untainted by any possible prior illegality.1
27
According to Justice White, the monitoring of the second ware-
house was not an illegal search because the beeper revealed only the
approximate location of the ether and not the precise locker in
which the respondents had stored the ether.128 After removing the
ether from the second warehouse, the respondents traveled with the
can only on public highways and were not vulnerable to illegal
search. Thus, from the second warehouse to the Taos house, the
agents' monitoring of the beeper did not invade the respondents'
constitutional rights. The agents had not tainted the evidence that
they had seized at the Taos house. The magistrate therefore should
not have suppressed the evidence with respect to any of the
respondents.12
9
Justice O'Connor concurred with Justice White in a separate
opinion 3 0 that was ambiguous and not related to the facts of Karo.
Justice O'Connor wrote that the privacy interests that agents invade
when they activate a beeper are much narrower than the Court had
implied in its opinion. 13 Justice O'Connor applied the Court's rea-





127 Id. at 3306.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 3307.
130 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
131 Id.
132 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (a homeowner has no reasonable expectation that a guest in




homeowner has no reasonable expectation that a guest in his home
will not bring a can containing a concealed beeper into the home.1
33
Justice O'Connor found flawed the Court's holding that the can
owner controls the privacy interest of the homeowner.' 3 4 The
Court indicated that as long as the can owner gives agents consent
to put a beeper in the can, the homeowner has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when the can owner brings the can into the
home.13 5 Yet, if the can owner does not consent to the placement of
the beeper on the can, the homeowner's privacy interest is invaded
when agents monitor the beeper within his home.
3 6
Justice O'Connor found the Court's reasoning unsound be-
cause she considered it inconsistent with Rawlings v. Kentucky.' 3 7 In
Rawlings, the Court held that when police searched a woman's purse
within her home, her male companion, who owned the drugs found
in the purse, lacked standing to challenge the search as an invasion
of his fourth amendment rights because he had no legitimate expec-
tation in the privacy of another person's closed purse, even though
he owned the contraband inside.' 38 Justice O'Connor concluded
that agents do not necessarily invade a homeowner's privacy rights
when they search a closed container that belongs to another without
the container owner's consent.
139
According to Justice O'Connor, a homeowner's expectations of
privacy cannot depend on an invitee's status. 140 For example, a
homeowner's expectation that a can in his home is beeper-free can-
not depend on whether the can owner believes that the can is or is
not beeper-free.' 4 ' A homeowner's expectations of privacy are
either inherently reasonable or unreasonable; the status of the guest
as an unknowing carrier of surveillance equipment or as a govern-
ment informant does not change the reasonableness of that expecta-
tion.' 42 Justice O'Connor did not explicitly apply this principle to
the facts of Karo; the logical conclusion of her assertion, however, is





137 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
138 Id. at 105-106.
139 104 S. Ct. at 3308 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). In a footnote, Justice White said that this argument is "inapposite" to Karo be-
cause in Rawlings, the agents did not search the male companion in his own home. Id. at
3304 n.4.





that the agents did not invade respondents' privacy interests be-
cause respondents had no reasonable expectation that their cans of
ether were beeper-free.
Justice O'Connor posited a narrower test to determine who can
assert a fourth amendment violation.' 43 The test would turn on the
defendant's "interest" in the container in which agents placed the
beeper. If a homeowner permits a guest to bring the guest's can
inside the home, the homeowner thereby relinquishes any expecta-
tion of privacy involving the can.144 To have any expectation of pri-
vacy, the homeowner must own the can or must control the can's
movements. In Karo, the homeowners and locker renters gave up
any expectation of privacy in the cans of ether when they allowed
others to bring the cans inside the homes or lockers.'
45
Justice O'Connor promulgated her test for three reasons.
146
First, the homeowner and the can owner have overlapping privacy
interests when the can is brought inside the home. The homeowner
has a privacy interest in his home, but not in the can. The home-
owner, therefore, lacks standing to complain when agents search the
can; 147 only the can owner can complain. Second, if privacy inter-
ests overlap, the homeowner and the can owner share power to con-
sent to a search. Either owner may give consent to a search and may
extinguish the other's right to claim that the government has in-
vaded a privacy interest.1 48 Third, when the can owner's privacy in-
terest falls within the homeowner's privacy interest (i.e., when the
can is inside the home, and the agents search the can without
searching the home), agents do not invade the homeowner's privacy
interest. 149 In this instance, the homeowner lacks the power to give
consent to agents to search the container. Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that, "[a] person's right not to have a container tracked by
means of a beeper depends both on his power to prevent visual ob-
servation of the container and on his power to control its location, a
power that can usually, be inferred from a privacy interest in the
container itself."' 50 Justice O'Connor implied that in Karo, the
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. Justice O'Connor apparently based this argument on the assumption that re-
spondents did not own the can of ether, despite their cash payment for it.
146 104 S. Ct. at 3308-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
147 Id. at 3309 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
148 Id.
149 Id. Justice O'Connor's implication is that agents search only the can and not the
home when they monitor a beeper concealed in a can while it is within the home.
150 Id. at 3310 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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agents did not invade respondents' privacy interests because the de-
fendant homeowners lacked standing to assert a privacy interest. 15 1
They lacked standing because they did not own the can containing
the beeper; the agents did not invade respondents' privacy interests
by monitoring the beeper even while the beeper was in respondents'
homes. 152 Because the agents had the consent of the true owner of
the can to affix the beeper, the true can owner's consent to the
beeper's presence had extinguished the homeowner's power to
claim that the agents had invaded their privacy interests. 15 In addi-
tion, when the can was inside the private residences, the agents
searched the cans but not the homes, so the agents did not invade
the homeowner's privacy interests.
154
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
Court's finding that the agents' attachment of the beeper to the can
of ether had not violated a privacy interest and that no search had
occurred when the agents attached the beeper to the can. 155 A
search occurs when an expectation "that society is prepared to con-
sider reasonable is infringed."' 156 A seizure occurs when a "mean-
ingful interference" with a possessory interest is present.
157
Attachment of a beeper to personal property, therefore, is both a
search and a seizure.158 Attachment of the beeper constitutes a
seizure because it infringes on an exclusionary right to private prop-
erty; in attaching the beeper to the can, the government agents con-
verted the property to their own use. 159 According to Justice
Stevens, the interference was meaningful because the beeper abso-
lutely changed the character of the can. 160 When the agents at-
tached the beeper to the can, the government was "in the most
fundamental sense. . . asserting 'dominion and control' over the
property-the power to use the property for its own purposes."'
161
Asserting dominion and control over an individual's property con-
stitutes a seizure.16
2
Justice Stevens then set forth the Court's test to determine





155 Id. at 3310 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 3310-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159 Id.





protection. 163 When a person exposes his property to the public, he
has no expectation of privacy; when a person conceals his property,
his property remains private and subject to fourth amendment pro-
tection. 164 All concealed private property is worthy of protection.'
65
"A homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of the home," including the property of others that is in
the home. 166 The homeowner's privacy interest, however, does not
obscure the can owner's privacy interest when the can owner con-
ceals the can in the homeowner's home.' 67 In Karo, the agents
monitored the beeper in a home where the respondents had con-
cealed the container from public view and thereby learned facts that
they could not have obtained without use of the beeper:
Once the container went into Karo's house, the agents thereafter
learned who had the container and where it was only through use of
the beeper. The beeper alone told them when the container was taken
into private residences and storage areas, and khen it was transported
from one place to another.
168
The illegal search began the moment that Karo took the can
into his house and concealed it.169 Thereafter, the respondents did
not expose the can to public view. 170 As a private citizen, Karo had
the right to assume that agents had not infested his property with
"bugs."' 17 Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's theory that
the agents invaded no privacy interest until they actually monitored
the beeper.' 72 That view, he said, came from looking at the incident
from the government's viewpoint, not from that of the private citi-
zen whose privacy is at stake. 173 The expectation of privacy is com-
163 Id. at 3311-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 3312 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)). Justice Stevens declared:
A constitutional distinction between worthy and unworthy containers would be im-
proper . . . . [T]he central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a
distinction. Forjust as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to
the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few items of clothing in a paper bag or a knotted
scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the
sophisticated executive with the locked attache case.
Id.
166 104 S. Ct. at 3312 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167 Id. at 3312-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168 Id. at 3313 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. at 3314 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id.
171 Id.




promised at the moment the invasion occurs. 174
Justice Stevens concluded by attacking Justice White's de novo
examination of the record and determination that the agents ob-
tained sufficient information independent of the beeper to furnish
probable cause to justify issuance of the second warrant for the
search in Taos. 175 He emphasized that neither the defense nor the
prosecution had raised this question in the petition for certiorari
and that the parties had neither briefed nor had an opportunity to
argue the issue. 176 Justice Stevens posited a resolution: to answer
the two questions before the Court and to remand the issue of evi-
dence to the trial court, thereby giving the parties the opportunity
to argue this issue.
177
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Katz found that the fourth amendment
protects the conversations of an individual using a public tele-
phone. 178 In Karo, respondents clearly exhibited an actual subjec-
tive expectation of privacy when they kept the containers of ether in
private homes and in rented private storage lockers.' 79 Certainly,
an individual who conceals a container in a home exhibits no less of
a subjective expectation of privacy than an individual who uses a
public telephone booth. The Court correctly found that the fourth
amendment protected respondents' acts of concealing the cans of
ether.' 80 If society considers an individual's expectation of privacy
in a telephone booth reasonable, it should consider even more rea-
sonable an expectation that a concealed container carrying noncon-
traband will not be "bugged" by electronic equipment.
The essence of the Court's holding in Karo, however, is that the
break in surveillance before the agents located the ether containers
in the second warehouse insulated all later surveillance from a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.' 8 ' The Court appears to have made
this conclusion for two reasons: first, because under Knotts, respon-
dents' traveling on public roads extinguished a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy thereafter; and second, because the agents' illegal




177 Id. at 3314-15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra notes 30-42 and accompany-
ing text.
179 Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3300.
180 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
181 Id. at 3306-07.
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"contribute" to the agents electronically locating the beeper at the
second warehouse. There are crucial fallacies in both arguments.
First, the beeper was monitored at various points throughout
the respondents' journey. The fact that respondents carried the
concealed can on public roads, and at that time had no reasonable
expectation that agents would not search their vehicle, should not
extinguish respondents' fourth amendment rights during the peri-
ods when they were in private areas protected by the fourth amend-
ment. If traveling on public roads extinguishes fourth amendment
protection in private areas, government agents will be given too
much discretion. Agents could reason that they can monitor private
areas without a warrant if it appears likely that the inhabitants will
thereafter travel on public roads; the agents could thus redress their
warrantless monitoring.
1 82
Second, the plurality's contention that prior monitoring of the
beeper did not "contribute" to the discovery of the beeper at the
second warehouse defies logic and staggers the imagination. Each
monitoring of the beeper was part of a sequence. Each movement
of the cans of ether from one location to the next comprised seg-
ments of the cans' complete journey from Muhlenweg to the Taos
house. Several of those segments were tainted by the agents' illegal
monitoring of private areas. Only by imagining that the cans' move-
ment from Muhlenweg to the second warehouse did not occur can
the Court assert that the tainted segments did not lead to the evi-
dence that the agents found in the Taos house. If those movements
had not occurred, the agents never would have found themselves in
the vicinity of the second warehouse and thus able to locate the
beeper's signal. The agents' prior illegal actions therefore necessar-
ily "contributed" to the discovery of the evidence and necessarily
tainted the evidence seized at the Taos residence.
The government agents legally could have searched respon-
dents' concealed private property only if they had obtained a valid
search warrant. This conclusion raises two questions: first, whether
the cans of ether were the respondents' private property; second,
whether the warrant the agents did obtain was valid.' 8 3 If the cans
were respondents' private property, the fourth amendment requires
that absent the owners' consent to a search, the agents would have
to obtain a search warrant to search the cans.
182 United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1441 n.6. The appellate court noted that "[law
enforcement officials could simply create a lapse by periodically turning off the monitor-
ing device; police would have unfettered discretion in determining when to monitor the
inside of private residences .... "
183 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
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The Court in Karo did not address the question of who owned
the can of ether at the moment the agents installed the beeper. The
Court assumed that the can belonged to either the DEA or to the
informant, Muhlenweg. This analysis simply is not logical because
Horton, Harley, and Karo purchased the ether, each paying
$1,000.00 for all of the cans. 184 Illustratively, if G gives to M a can
to sell to K, when M sells the can to K, the can belongs to K.
Neither G nor M have any possessory interest in the can. Neither
the consent of G nor the consent of M can validate the placement of
an object in the can. Because only K has a possessory interest, K
alone could give consent to G to install an electronic device in his
can of ether.
The government agents did not have the owners' consent to
place the beeper in the can; thus, how could the Court justify not
requiring the agents to obtain a valid warrant for the attachment of
the beeper? The Court consistently has recognized that warrants
are necessary to validate a search inside a home absent exigent cir-
cumstances.18 5 In his dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis asserted
that any time government actions were "unjustifiable," they in-
truded on the individual's privacy and thus violated the fourth
amendment.' 86 Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in
Silverman, stated that the Court should not match irrelevant facts,
but should consider whether the government invaded a citizen's pri-
vacy.' 8 7 If government agents invaded a citizen's privacy and if the
agents had not obtained a search warrant as required by the fourth
amendment, the government cannot convict the defendant.' 8 8 In
Katz, the Court held that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by [a] judge. . . are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifi-
cally established.., expectations. ' 189
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Ross, outlined the reasons for re-
quiring a warrant: "it limits police power over the individual and
prevents unjustified searches; it prevents a post hoc coloring of rea-
184 Brief of Respondents Harley and Horton In Opposition at 4-5 n.2., United States
v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
185 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Exigent circum-
stances include response to an emergency, hot pursuit, and goods in the process of
destruction or about to be removed from the jurisdiction. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 35 (1970).
186 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
188 Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
189 389 U.S. at 357.
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sonableness that was not present at the time of the search; and, it
reassures the public of the orderly process of law."1 90 The Court in
Karo necessarily had to find that the attachment of the beeper to the
can of ether did not violate the fourth amendment in order to pre-
empt the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Karo correctly questioned the
Court's assumption that a beeper does not compromise privacy
rights until it is monitored. 19 1 Justice Stevens reasoned that the in-
vasion of privacy occurred the moment that the agents attached the
beeper to the can. The attachment completely changed the nature
of the can and infringed upon respondents' privacy right.19 2 The
agents "usurped" a citizen's private property for the government's
use. 193 Government agents do not affix beepers to objects unless
they intend to monitor the beepers. It is an eminently reasonable
expectation that a can containing noncontraband will not have a
beeper attached to it. A beeper is not an object that will sit unobtru-
sively on the side of the can and that will not infringe upon a per-
son's privacy interests. An electronic beeper is a powerful invasive
instrument that the government can use to track a private citizen's
every movement. Government agents should have to obtain a valid
warrant before they are allowed to affix such an instrument to a pri-
vate citizen's property. 1
9 4
The Court in Karo incorrectly applied the exclusionary rule.
The Alderman Court's cost/benefit balancing test for admitting or
excluding evidence indicated that the archetypal fact pattern for ex-
clusion of evidence exists when, but for the illegal search, govern-
ment agents would not have obtained the evidence.' 9 5 The Court in
Karo ignored the Alderman test; Karo has the archetypal fact pattern
that excludes evidence.' 96 The agents never would have obtained
any evidence in Karo without the use of the beeper. All the fruits in
Karo are tainted. The Court should have excluded all the evi-
dence. 19 7 The Court in Karo legitimized the agents' illegal conduct
and implied that the government can use unlawful means against an
individual to obtain evidence. As a result, law enforcement officers
will have less incentive to adhere to fourth amendment
190 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 829 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191 104 S. Ct. at 3310-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. at 3311 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 id.
194 See U.S. v. Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 446-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
rationale of the search warrant requirement as it applies to electronic surveillance).
195 394 U.S. at 174-75.
196 See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.





Furthermore, in Karo, the Court answered a question that was
not before it when it found that the evidence seized in the Taos
house was untainted.' 99 As Justice Stevens pointed out, neither
party had the opportunity to argue the issue.200
Courts frequently consider on appeal questions that were not
presented below.20 ' The Supreme Court has considered such issues
on the theory that it may do so when the issue has been briefed, is
properly before the Court, and is urged as an alternative to support a
judgment.20 2 In Karo, however, not only was the question of the
validity of the Taos warrant not properly before the Court, it was
offered against, not in support of, the judgment below. In finding
certain evidence untainted, the Court assumed the validity of the
affidavit for the Taos warrant.20 3 Yet the parties had not litigated
that issue at any level of the Karo proceedings. 20 4 Indeed, the Taos
affidavit contained false and misleading information. For example,
the affidavit asserted incorrectly that the informant had offered
"large amounts of information in the past" regarding drug dealing,
and that the agents were investigating an amphetamine manufactur-
ing conspiracy rather than a cocaine extracting operation. 20 5 The
198 See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1393-96
(1983). Former Justice Stewart identifies and responds to four criticisms of the exclu-
sionary rule: (1) The high cost to society when guilty persons are set free. Stewart answers by
saying that the rule rarely affects the outcome of a case. The fourth amendment, not the
exclusionary rule, must be blamed if evidence must be excluded. The gravity of the
sanction is likely to increase its deterrent effect on law enforcement officers. (2) The rule
does not deter police from acting illegally. Stewart's response is that the dramatic increase in
the number of search warrants issued since the development of the rule indicates its
deterrent effect. (3) The rule benefits defendants disproportionately to the degree that their rights
were violated. Stewart finds this criticism uncompelling because the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to preserve fourth amendment guarantees and not to compensate the
victim. (4) Innocent victims of search and seizure derive no benefit from the rule; the rule compensates
only alleged criminals. Stewart finds the rule necessary despite the fact that it is not a
sufficient remedy to cover both alleged criminals and innocent victims. Innocent victims
still have a right of action in damages. Id.
199 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
200 Id. at 3314 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes
175-77 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., City of Revere v. Mass. General Hospital, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983).
202 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970). The Court noted
that when the question is urged in support of the lower court's judgment, it may be ap-
propriate to remand the case "when attention has been focused on other issues" and
when the lower court has not expressed its views on a controlling question. Id.
203 104 S. Ct. at 3314 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204 Respondents' Petition for Rehearing at 5, United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984).
205 Id. at 5-6.
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district court had found many of the assertions in the Taos affidavit
"as phony as a three dollar bill." 20 6
Thus, the decision in Karo has serious implications for honest
law enforcement. On the basis of the decision in Karo, DEA agents
will have little concern for the accuracy of their allegations when
they make future applications for warrants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Karo followed precedent
and ruled that the warrantless monitoring of a beeper in a can that
contained noncontraband while the can was located in private areas
violated the fourth amendment. Individuals who conceal their
property in private areas have a reasonable expectation that their
actions will remain private and that concealed containers containing
noncontraband will not surreptitiously carry electronic surveillance
equipment. Government agents may not attach electronic equip-
ment to private property to monitor the electronic signal while the
property is in private homes unless they have a warrant validated by
an objective magistrate.
The Court, however, did not follow precedent in its additional
holdings in Karo: that attachment of the beeper to the can was not a
search and seizure, and that evidence that the agents had obtained
only by means of the beeper was untainted. Attaching a beeper to
an individual's private property changes the nature of the property
and infringes on the exclusive possessory right of the property
owner. Evidence obtained only by means of an illegal search is
tainted and cannot be used in a court of law.
The Supreme Court has gone too far in Karo. The result is an
untenable encroachment on the individual's fourth amendment pro-
tections against search and seizure. Additionally, the most formida-
ble remedy by which to secure that fourth amendment protection-
the exclusionary rule-has become a hollow shell.
DAWN WEBBER
206 Id. at 2.
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